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"The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the
United States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigra-
tion law."'
INTRODUCTION
As Justice Breyer observes in Zadvydas, the drawing of borders-
between member and non-member, insider and outsider, the interior and
the exterior-lies at the heart of immigration law.' These distinctions
t Reprinted with permission from Stanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties
and Immigration and Nationality Review. This Article originally appeared in 3 STAN. J. C.R.
& C.L. 165 (2007).
* Leah Kaplan Visiting Professor in Human Rights, Stanford Law School (2006-
2007); Canada Research Chair in Citizenship and Multiculturalism, Faculty of Law, Univer-
sity of Toronto.
1. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
2. Recent years have seen a rich vintage of scholarly analyses of these distinctions.
Among the most influential discussions, see T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF
SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002); RAINER
BAUBOCK, TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP: MEMBERSHIP AND RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL MI-
GRATION (1994); SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND
CITIZENS (2004); LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPO-
RARY MEMBERSHIP (2006); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY
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bear dramatic consequences for the scope of rights, protections, and op-
portunities that noncitizens hold. They also partake in shaping (and re-
shaping) the nation's membership boundaries as well as its territorial,
jurisdictional, and geographical frontiers. The interaction between the
government's power to restrict access and the conceptualization of where
the U.S. border begins and ends is the topic of my inquiry here. Some
facts are clear enough: U.S. immigration law has long held that an alien
who is stopped at the border enjoys far less protection than a person who
is already within this country.' Core constitutional rights, most notably
due process, apply to all persons residing in the United States, "whatever
[their] status under immigration laws"-as the Supreme Court asserted
in Plyler.4 Yet such rights remain unavailable to would-be immigrants so
long as they remain outside the geographical borders of the United
States.' The notion that legal circumstances affecting non-members sub-
stantively change after they "pass through our gates" is well entrenched
in immigration law, as the canonical case law from Shaughnessy to
Zadvydas attests.6 But where precisely do the territorial and jurisdic-
tional borders of the United States lie for immigration regulation
purposes? My concern here is not where the boundaries of membership
should lie, but rather, more concretely, where they do lie, in U.S. immi-
gration law and practice.
A novice to the field of immigration might expect the legal bounda-
ries of inclusion and exclusion to correlate with the "cartographic"
borders of U.S. territory. The reality, however, is far more complicated.
The firm borderlines drawn in the world atlas do not necessarily coincide
with those adhered to, indeed created through, immigration law and pol-
icy. Instead, we increasingly witness a border that is in flux: at once
more open and more closed than in the past. More important still for the
purpose of our discussion, the location of the border is shifting-at times
penetrating into the interior, in other circumstances extending beyond the
edge of the territory. And in other contexts, these borders are reappear-
ing, ever more robustly, as a physically refortified barrier, offering a
sharp demarcation line between the U.S. and its neighbors to the South
and the North.
OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE
SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004); PETER H.
SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZEN-
SHIP (1998).
3. See Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925).
4. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
5. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990).
6. Shaugnessy v. United States ex reL. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
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While American immigration law is still largely informed by the
doctrine of plenary power, which holds that "[a]dmission to the United
States is a privilege granted by the sovereign" (as the Supreme Court
asserted in Knauff more than fifty years ago),7 what has dramatically
changed in recent years is the location of "our gates," which no longer
stand at the country's territorial edges. Instead, the border itself has be-
come a moving barrier, a legal construct that is not tightly fixed to
territorial benchmarks.8 This shifting border of immigration regulation,
as we might call it, is selectively utilized by national immigration regula-
tors to regain control over their crucial realm of responsibility, to
determine who to permit to enter, who to remove, and who to keep at
bay.
The crux of my argument is that the state's ability to flexibly redraw
the border for immigration regulation purposes is a key component in the
new policy-toolbox developed by the U.S. (and other leading immigrant-
destination countries) to reassert control over their so-called "broken"
borders in the age of increased international mobility and security risks.9
In contrast with the predictions of post-nationalists and others who have
told us that the retreat of the regulatory state and the breaking down of
borders is imminent, the domestic and comparative examples discussed
here demonstrate how border controls are being "retooled and redes-
igned" by nation-states to better respond to changing needs and
challenges in the current age of globalization.'0
This redesign has been accomplished by enforcing the sovereign
prerogative to deny or permit access in a whole new way: by redrawing
(indeed, redefining) the once fixed and static territorial border, trans-
forming it into something more malleable and movable, which can be
placed and replaced-by the words of law-in whatever location that
best suits the goal of restricting access. By employing sophisticated legal
maneuvers that establish this new multi-faceted border, the regulatory
7. United States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
8. See LEGAL BORDERLANDS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS
(Mary L. Dudziak & Leti Volpp eds., 2006).
9. See, e.g., CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Wayne Cornelius
et. al. eds., 1994).
10. My work here is in line with a set of critical reflections on the theme of "losing
control." See, e.g., Virginie Guiraudon & Galia Lahav, A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty
Debate: The Case of Migration Control, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 163 (2000) [hereinafter Gui-
raudon and Lahav, A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate]; Christian Joppke,
Immigration Challenges the Nation-State, in CHALLENGE TO THE NATION-STATE: IMMIGRA-
TION IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 5 (Christian Jopke ed., 1998). A
politically astute tale of symbolically regaining control is offered by Peter Andreas, The
Escalation of U.S. Immigration Control in the Post-NAFTA Era, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 591 (Winter
1998-1999).
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state is enhancing and expanding-rather than waning and losing (as
many theorists have suggested) its immigration-enforcement authority to
act against "unwanted intruders."
To comprehend the novelty of the shifting border of immigration
regulation, we must contrast it with contending views: the classic,
clearly demarcated territorial border that serves as the front-line for set-
ting barriers to admission; and the contrasting, globalist vision of a
world in which extant borders are traversed with the greatest of ease, to
the extent that they become all but meaningless, serving merely as ar-
chaic relics of a bygone era. It is convenient to refer to these competing
approaches as the "static" vs. "disappearing" conceptions of the border. I
will briefly discuss each in turn.
The classic Westphalian ideal of statehood places the border as a
permanent and static barrier that stands at the frontier of a country's ter-
ritory. This formidable border serves a crucial role in delimiting
(externally) and binding (internally) a nation's territory, jurisdiction, and
peoplehood, correlating with a notion of fixed "legal spatiality."" For
many years, this concept permeated immigration law and policy. Accord-
ingly, it is at the border that agents of the state are permitted to exercise
the utmost control over access, including the decision "to turn back from
our gates any alien or class of aliens."'2 Yet this resolves only part of the
puzzle. The question that occupies us here is where precisely the border
itself is to be found for immigration regulation purposes. It is here that
the classic notion of the firmly planted territorial border simply does not
correlate with the actual reality we find on the ground.
Neither, however, does the fashionable claim that borders are "dis-
appearing" provide a satisfactory explanation to the phenomenon of the
shifting border.' 3 In recent years, theorists of post-nationalism, trans-
nationalism, and open-border admission policies have painted a picture
of a new world order in which borders are blurred, global commerce and
11. See Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2503
(2005); see also John H. Herz, Rise and Demise of the Territorial State, 9 WORLD POL. 473,
480-481 (1957).
12. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 228 U.S. 537, 550 (1950) (Jackson J.,
dissenting).
13. See DAVID HELD, GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND CULTURE
(1999); INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Robert Keohane & Helen Milner,
eds., 1996); KENICHI OHMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD: POWER AND STRATEGY IN THE
INTERLINKED ECONOMY (1990); SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE
OF GLOBALIZATION (1996) [hereinafter SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL?]; see also Neil Brenner,
Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Stud-
ies, 28 THEORY & SOC'Y 39 (1999); Edward S. Cohen, Globalization and the Boundaries of
the State: A Framework for Analyzing the Changing Practice of Sovereignty, 14 GOVERNANCE
81 (2001).
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human mobility is on the rise, and international human rights instru-
ments gain sway. 4 As a corollary, those theorists have claimed that the
old territorial border can no longer carry the weight of restricting access
of non-citizens seeking to enter.'5 Such developments, so goes the stan-
dard argument, eventually lead to a decline in the power of states to
exercise exclusive authority over spatially bounded territories and their
respective inhabitants. 6 On this account, immigrants are seen as the van-
guards in testing "the new world order"-their authorized (or more so,
unauthorized) movement across borders symbolizes the impossibility of
enforcing strict immigration controls over access in an increasingly in-
terdependent world. 7
While these arguments may appear persuasive on paper, in practice,
immigration law's shifting borders have not necessarily correlated with
the demise of regulatory authority over defining whom to include and
whom to exclude. 8 If anything, an opposite trend can be identified: the
relaxing of the linkage between territory and authority has given greater
latitude for national legislatures and regulatory agencies to develop new
enforcement policies that manipulate the border-bleeding it into the
interior or extending it beyond the territory's exterior -whenever such
maneuvers are beneficial to deter access by irregular migrants deemed
inadmissible or deportable.' 9
Charting the logic of this new cartography (or legal reconstruction)
of the U.S. border in the context of immigration regulation is my task
here. I discuss seven vivid illustrations of the emerging "malleable bor-
der" concept. First, I show how Section 212 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) created the distinction between "entry" and "ad-
mission" for restricting access to unauthorized migrants, even if they
have already physically crossed the border into the territory of
14. See SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL
ASSEMBLAGES (2006); YASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND
POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994); see also RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMU-
NITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY (Daniele Archiugi et. al. eds., 1998); Linda
Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000).
15. See SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL?, supra note.
16. See Guiraudon and Lahav, A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate, supra
note 10.
17. See SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL?, supra note 14.
18. See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS
6 (2004).
19. Irregular migrants are those traveling without the proper documentation required
for lawfully crossing international borders by land, air, or sea. With the exception of asylum
seekers, irregular migrants are deemed "inadmissible" or "deportable" from the United States.
The latter are terms of art in immigration law, as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006) and 8
U.S.C. § 1227 (2006), respectively.
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the United States. I further illustrate the shifting border of immigration
regulation through the procedure of expedited removal, which is desig-
nated to take place "at the border"; however, we will see that this has
been implemented not only in the interior but also extended beyond the
external perimeter of the U.S borderline. A third example I explore here
is the advances in the collection of biometric information from non-
citizens in the context of pre-inspection procedures, which increasingly
takes place outside the territory of the U.S. or its land, air, and sea ports-
of-entry. To that end, American immigration officials stationed abroad
are empowered to exercise their full legal authority under the INA over
those who are yet to board a plane or ship heading towards the United
States, effectively pushing the "shifting" border farther away from the
territory and into new terrains of technological regulation and informa-
tion collection.
The Fourth Part investigates how "smart border" agreements partake
in redrawing the border of immigration regulation at the continental
level, creating a "buffer zone" around high-demand countries. I then un-
derscore the potentially detrimental impact of these recent developments
not only on the situation of non-citizens, but on that of citizens as well.
Next, I turn to explore similar developments in comparable immigrant-
receiving countries: Canada and Australia. In Part six, I show how
Canada is adopting aggressive measures of overseas "interdiction" of air
travelers in order to avoid admission of unwanted migrants to its terri-
tory, much in the same vein as America's pre-inspection measures. I also
discuss the growing reliance on private actors (such as airline carriers) in
conducting the task of weeding out legitimate travelers from those
deemed high-risk. A seventh and final illustration of the malleable border
concept focuses on Australia's far-reaching excision policy, which
"erases off' certain parts of its territory from the map, creating an "exci-
sion zone" where Australia's standard immigration law provisions do not
apply-with dramatic consequences for limiting the rights and protec-
tions of unauthorized entrants.
I conclude by offering a few remarks on the future of the U.S. bor-
der, which appears to be resurrected as a physical barrier at certain
charged ports-of-entry, especially along the U.S.-Mexico borderline. By
locating the shifting border as an alternative to the established theoretical
poles of "static" versus "disappearing" boundaries, I show that neither of
these visions captures the dynamics of the new regulatory regime of the
shifting border. I place at center stage what too-often remains at the
margins: documenting and explaining the manifold, indeed conceptually
[Vol. 30:809
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far-reaching, "re-invention" of the border by regulatory agencies en-
trusted with the state apparatus of migration and border control. 0
I. LAW'S ADMISSION GATES: THE CHANGING
MEANING OF "ENTRY"
The very act of crossing the border into U.S. territory is no longer
treated as legally relevant for changing one's status from "an alien who
has never entered" into one who "has effected an entry," to use the clas-
sic terminology of immigration law. Since the introduction of
Section 212(a)(6)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as
part of the 1996 immigration reforms, which codified into law some of
the most fundamental changes to U.S. immigration policy in recent
memory, those who physically enter the country are no longer consid-
ered to have passed through "our gates. 21 While it may sound like an
oxymoron, the hocus-pocus of detaching fact from law can occur in the
realm of immigration regulation by setting apart the physical act of entry
from the legal notion of admission. The INA creates this legal construct
by distinguishing between physical entry into the country (which does
not count for immigration purposes) and lawful admission at a recog-
nized port-of-entry (which makes one's presence in the country
permissible, and therefore visible, in the eyes of the regulatory state).22 In
this way, entry into the territory-the material act of crossing the geo-
graphical border and physically being present within the jurisdiction of
the United States, does not equate with gaining immigration-related pro-
cedural protections that would apply to those who have been admitted.
This change in the meaning of "entry" can occur given the shifting
conception of the border: "an alien present in the United States without
being admitted," to recite the somewhat cryptic language of the statute,
is treated as if the non-citizen (who is already present on the territory)
never really crossed the border into the country. 23 This "as if' fiction
20. Since 2003, federal regulation, administration, and enforcement of immigration law
and border control lies with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was created
in the post 9/11 era as part of the largest makeover of the federal government's institutional
structure since World War II. 6 U.S.C. § 111 (2006).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(A).
22. 8 U.S.C. § I I01(a)(13)(A) reads as follows: "The term 'admission' and 'admitted'
mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspec-
tion and authorization by an immigration officer." On the pre-1996 situation of excludable
aliens, see Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 E3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
479 (1995).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). These individuals will have certain constitutional pro-
tections while in the country. This distinction between "alienage law" and "immigration law"
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bears serious consequences for aliens "present in the United States with-
out being admitted." For instance, they are subject to inadmissibility
rather than deportation grounds (the former are more strict than the lat-
ter)2 and their unlawful admission becomes a bar precluding
regularization of status or the application of waivers in removal proc-
esses.2 ' The final element in relinquishing their prospect of lawful
admission to the United States in the future is that the INA makes the
very act of crossing without inspection (the otherwise non-recognized
presence of the non-citizen on the territory) into the "main substantive
charge used to remove them. 26
In creating the legal distinction between "entry" and "admission,"
the INA effectively treats individuals present in the country without au-
thorization as if they had been stopped at the border-where aliens have
traditionally enjoyed fewer protections under U.S. immigration law than
non-citizens who have actually made it into the interior. But this legal
maneuver can only occur by "redrawing the traditional exclusion-
deportation line" under a shifting conception of the border, which is no
longer tied to the territorial perimeter. Instead, the exclusion-
deportation line has become de-territorialized: the key factor for the
legal analysis is not whether the person has passed through the territory's
frontiers (where the border traditionally resided). Rather the only ques-
tion that matters for immigration regulation purposes is whether the
person has crossed at any time or place through law's gates of admis-
sion, which, as the INA proclaims without hesitation, are not territorially
fixed but rather "designated by the Attorney General. 28
II. THE SHRINKING AND EXPANDING BORDER:
THE CASE OF EXPEDITED REMOVAL
Consider another legal technique of de-coupling territory from au-
thority in the effort to curb "unwanted" admission. With the ushering in
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
is perhaps best articulated in the writings of Linda Bosniak. See, e.g., BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN
AND THE ALIEN supra note 2.
24. 8 U.S.C. § I I82(a)(6)(A)(i) and 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
25. See the waivers from removal specified in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H), which are
easier to establish than those appearing in 8 U.S.C. § 1 I 82(i).
26. See IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 428 (Thomas Alexander
Aleinikoff et. al. eds., 5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP]. There is
also a 10-year bar to re-admission.
27. Id.
28. See 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(6)(A)(i).
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(IIRIRA) of 1996, Congress created a new procedure called "expedited
removal."' 9 This removal procedure "sharply redefined-downward-
what process is due an individual who arrives at [the] border and is
deemed not to have proper documents to enter."30 Expedited removal
grants the immigration officer at the border the ultimate power to issue a
removal order against aliens arriving in the United States or seeking ad-
mission to its territory, if they have no travel documents or possess
potentially fraudulent ones. 31 An expedited removal order is both formal
and conclusive. As the INA explicitly states, "the officer shall order the
alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review
.... ,32 This weighty decision to exclude is typically made by low-level
immigration officers following a short interview with the arriving indi-
vidual that takes place at the port of entry.33 Vesting such immense
powers in the hands of front-line officers-the "gate-keepers" of the na-
tion, whose expedited removal decisions are largely shielded from
administrative and judicial review-appears at first blush to reconstitute
the familiar cartographic borderline as the ultimate locus for protecting
the country against unwelcomed intruders. But, then again, where pre-
cisely does this border lie?
When Congress introduced the procedure of expedited removal, it
authorized the Attorney General (now the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security [DHS]) "to apply the procedure to persons who en-
tered illegally and who had not been physically present in the United
States for more than two years."3 In other words, expedited removal-a
procedure typically exercised at the "edge" of territory-could apply
with equal force to individuals who have already been present within the
country for a period of up to two years.
Based on this authorization, the DHS issued a set of regulations (in
2002, 2004, and 2006) that permit immigration officials to expeditiously
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c). As initially implemented, expedited removal was only applied
to arriving aliens at the nation's ports of entry.
30. See Stephen M. Knight, Defining Due Process Down: Expedited Removal in the
United States, 19 REFUGE 41,41 (2000).
31. 8 U.S.C. § I 182(7)(A)(i).
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(l)(a)(i). The only exception to this rule is that an arriving non-
citizen who indicates an intention to apply for asylum and establishes "credible fear" of perse-
cution is detained and referred to an asylum officer who must determine whether the
individual will be permitted access to the U.S. asylum system. If the individual makes the case
for credible fear, he or she will then be placed in a standard removal process, which offers
greater procedural protection and permits the individual to make the claim for asylum. See 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(l)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30(d), 235.3(c) (2006).
33. It further bears the additional penalty of making the person inadmissible for five
years. See 8 USC § 182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2006).
34. RICHARD A. BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 37 (2006).
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return undocumented migrants found within 100 miles of the border up
to fourteen days after their actual crossing, through the exercise of expe-
dited removal. This authorization means that non-citizens apprehended
inland are treated, for immigration regulation purposes, as though they
had been caught at the U.S. border, effectively blurring the line between
the perimeter and the interior. This redrawing of the border has signifi-
cant legal effects, including the elimination of various procedural
protections from the removal process. The most glaring impact of expe-
dited removal is that it precludes access to administrative and judicial
review of the immigration officer's decision, taking away established
legal safeguards that would have been available in standard interior re-
moval processes.35 It also imposes a lower onus on the government in
establishing the grounds for removal when compared to a full-blown
(and judicially reviewable) removal hearing.16
Beyond these technicalities of positive law, what is important for our
discussion is the recognition that one's presence within the territory of
the United States is no longer a guard against expedited removal by offi-
cers of the executive branch, who are free to make swift and irrevocable
deportation decisions, on the same terms as if the person was detected at
the border. This cannot occur without reliance on the shifting border of
immigration regulation, which permits these decisions to be made with-
out granting the affected individual access to the courts, although the
outcome carries the most telling personal consequences. These decisions
bear directly, as the authors of a leading casebook in immigration law
put it, "on just where home will be, and on which relatives and friends
will share in life's triumphs and defeats."37 In this example, the border
has been detached from its traditional location at the perimeter of the
country's edges-it has now "moved" 100 miles into the interior, by re-
lying on the legal fiction of removing unwanted migrants "at the border"
when they are already firmly within its perimeter.38 As officials at the
Department of Homeland Security appear to see it, the legislative man-
date to protect the integrity of the territorial border is no longer tied to a
35. See Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland
Security Streamlines Removal Process Along Entire U.S. Border (Jan. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press-release_0845.shtm [hereinafter Streamlining Re-
moval Process].
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) & (2). The implementation of expedited removal along the
entire U.S-Mexico, U.S-Canada, and all U.S. coastal areas has followed a more limited appli-
cation along the "ports-of-entry at all nine U.S. Customs and Border Protection (BCE) Border
Patrol Sectors on the Southwest border." 1d; see also Designating Aliens for Expedited Re-
moval, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877 (Aug. 11, 2004).
37. See IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 26, at 750.
38. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. at 48,877.
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specific geographical location. While expedited removal currently bleeds
100 miles into the territory, the DHS has recently declared that its bor-
der-enforcement measures may well expand "nationwide.'39
The shifting border of immigration regulation is not restricted to
inland application. It may also stretch in the other direction-outward,
beyond the territory as well-for instance, when expedited removal pro-
cedures are applied to persons interdicted in international or United
States waters.40 This outward stretch has a similar effect of beefing up the
reach of immigration-enforcement efforts. In both shrinking and expand-
ing the reach of the border, the regulatory state is attempting to regain
control over access to its territory and restrict the procedural protections
that attach to crossing "our gates." This goal is expressed loudly by the
authorized agents of the federal government, such as the Secretary of the
DHS, who, in announcing these new measures, asserted that: "we made
a commitment [today] to implement new tactics throughout the U.S. in
order to gain control of our borders.'
III. MOVING BEYOND THE NATION'S TERRITORY: BIOMETRIC
REGULATION AND PRE-INSPECTION
To provide another illustration of the unprecedented reach of the
shifting border in the post-9/11 era, consider the collection of biometric
information by U.S. immigration officials from authorized visitors enter-
ing the United States (approximately 175 million people annually).42
This mega-operation, entitled US-VISIT, demands that individuals hold-
ing visas or those coming from visa-waiver countries present themselves
to an immigration officer at a port-of-entry, where their two index fin-
gers and digital photo will be taken and stored in a massive government
39. See Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Secure Border
Initiative (Nov. 2, 2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press release_
0794.shtm.
40. Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under Section
235(b)(l)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68924 (Nov. 13, 2002)
(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q) (2002)).
41. See Streamlining Removal Process, supra note 35.
42. See DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
2005 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 63, tbl. 25 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 YEARBOOK
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS]. Of these non-immigrant entries, the vast majority (142 million,
or 82%) were short-time visitors for business or pleasure from Canada and non-resident aliens
crossing from Mexico with an authorized Border Crossing Card (BCC or "laser visa"). The
remaining 33 million completed the 1-94 arrival/departure form at a port of entry. Of those
entrants, 29 million were admitted on a short-term B I/B2 visa for business or pleasure. Id.
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database used to match and authenticate their travel documents. 3 In issu-
ing the regulations governing the US-VISIT program ("notice of
requirement for biometric collection from certain nonimmigrant aliens"
in the technocratic language of the Federal Registrar)," the DHS has
taken the occasion not only to specify who must submit to it ("nonimmi-
grant aliens") 5 and when ("upon arrival"),46 but also where such
inspection may take place.47 The latter component is of most significance
to us: arrival in the United States, as defined by federal regulations, can
take place at designated air, land, and sea ports-of-entry.48 This is not
surprising; it is at these ports-of-entry that immigration officials are typi-
cally stationed. But what is surprising is that the collection of biometric
information by U.S. immigration officials can take place outside the
United States-in foreign territories-sometimes located tens, hundreds,
or even thousands of miles away from the country's actual territorial
borders, in places such as Ireland's Dublin or Shannon international air-
ports, Canada's Toronto and Montreal international airports, or Bermuda
and Bahamas' international airports.49 None of these spaces can plausibly
be construed to lie within U.S. territory, yet American immigration offi-
cials conduct their business there as a matter of course.
The presence of U.S. immigration officials abroad for the US-VISIT
program is part of a larger strategy of "pre-inspection," which permits
these agents to determine whom to include and whom to exclude "upon
arrival," despite the fact that the people they interview have yet to board
a flight to the United States. What is more, these immigration officials'
43. See Department of Homeland Security, U.S.-VISIT: How It Works, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xtrvlsec/programs/editorial_0525.shtm (last visited Apr. 12, 2007) [here-
inafter Keeping America's Doors Open]. The Acting Director of U.S-VISIT recently stated
that DHS wants to move to a ten-print system in order to "make identifications even more
reliable," noting that "[w]e're now at 80 million-plus individuals in the system." See Adam
Liptak, Adding to Security but Multiplying the Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2007, at A14.
44. Notice to Nonimmigrant Aliens Subject to be Enrolled in the United States Visitor
and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology System, 69 Fed. Reg. 482 (Jan. 5, 2004).
45. Id. The notice applies to non-immigrant entrants from around the world, with lim-
ited exceptions.
46. Id.
47. As of March, 12, 2007, US-VISIT entry inspections were in place at 116 airports,
15 seaports, and 154 land ports. See the list specifying air and seaports designated for US-
VISIT inspection, Department of Homeland Security, US-VISIT: Current Ports of Entry,
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xtrvlsec/programs/editorial_0685.shtm (last visited Apr. 12,
2007).
48. According to U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, there are 327 such ports of entry in
the United States and 15 preclearance points in Canada and the Caribbean. U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol, Ports of Entry, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgovltoolboxlports (last visited May 13,
2007).
49. See Keeping America's Doors Open, supra note 43.
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decisions bear the full weight and authority of the INA. In other words,
those deemed inadmissible will not be permitted to board any plane or
ship heading to America. They are prohibited from even embarking on
their international journey towards the promised land of immigration."
This drastic measure of "de-territorialization" requires significant con-
ceptual change in the perception of the border. U.S. immigration officers
normally make such determinations "at the border"-but here the terri-
tory of the U.S. is no longer anywhere in sight: the border has instead
been removed to non-U.S. soil.
Such techniques of pre-inspection to weed out unauthorized travelers
may well prove to be the wave of the future; they arguably are an immi-
gration regulator's dream tool to deter unwanted admission. As the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) noted in a recent report,
"[m]any states which have the ability to do so find that intercepting mi-
grants before they reach their territories is one of the most effective
measures to enforce their domestic immigration laws and policies."5'
This insight has not been lost by the architects of the shifting border. The
INA now authorizes U.S. immigration officers to examine and inspect at
the point of origin the passengers and crew of "any aircraft, vessel, or
train proceeding directly, without stopping, from a port or place in for-
eign territory to a port-of-entry in the United States ....,52 As noted
above, decisions made by U.S. immigration officials at these non-U.S.
locations are final determinations of admissibility. 3 This radical "re-
location" of the border-placing it in a foreign territory's jurisdiction-
is made possible through a combination of international cooperation (by
the countries on whose territory U.S. agents are permitted to conduct the
pre-inspection) and domestic authorization. The latter is found in the dry,
bureaucratic words of American immigration law, which hold that in-
spection made "at the port or place in the foreign territory ... shall have
the same effect under the Act as though made at the destined port-of-
entry in the United States.' 5
Such de-coupling of legal authority from the geographic boundaries
of the nation-state represents an extreme variant of the technique of "de-
territorializing" the border for immigration regulation purposes. It is
50. This raises serious concern about migration inflows moving to unregulated chan-
nels. See Andrew Brouwer & Judith Kumin, Interception and Asylum: When Migration
Control and Human Rights Collide, 21 REFUGE 6 (2003).
51. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ET AL., NGO BACKGROUND PAPER ON THE REFUGEE AND
MIGRATION INTERFACE (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/campaignslrefugees/ngo-
document/ngorefugee.pdf.
52. 8 C.F.R. § 235.5(b) (2006).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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increasingly popular among well-off countries trying to take anticipatory
or preventive action by extending their influence far away from their own
geographical boundaries in order to curb territorial entry by irregular
migrants. The United States is not alone in adopting these "re-capture"
techniques. For instance, Canada and Australia-which, like the United
States, are among the world's leading immigrant-receiving countries-
share related concerns about deterring unauthorized admission. And they
too have responded by adopting striking techniques of "shifting" the
border of immigration regulation, with variations corresponding to their
distinct geopolitical characteristics and jurisprudential precedents that
create corresponding immigration-control challenges.5
IV. "SMARTENING" BORDERS THROUGH BILATERAL AND
MULTILATERAL COOPERATION
Before we move to consider these comparative examples, let me
provide one final illustration of another legal method for shifting the
border away from the territorial frontiers: creating a semi-hemispheric
"ring" of border control, in this context, around the United States and
Canada.16 The evidence of increased immigration- and customs-control
cooperation in North America is not often discussed, but its reach is
overwhelming. It is best represented by the creation of the "smart bor-
der" in 2002 (a year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks) between the United
States and Canada, which was later partly extended to Mexico as well.
The smart border, as its constitutive thirty-point Action Plan declares, is
designed to "enhance the security of our shared border while facilitating
the legitimate flow of people and goods." 7 It relies on four pillars: the
secure flow of people, the secure flow of goods, secure infrastructure,
and information sharing and coordination in the enforcement of these
objectives. The smart border has been "upgraded," through regulatory
action, to cover new areas of cooperation, such as bio-security and the
55. See infra Parts VI and VII (discussing concerns and immigration measures taken by
the Canadian and Australian governments).
56. See, Ambassador Michael Kergin, Canadian Embassy, Remarks to the Houston
World Affairs Council (Mar. 21, 2001), available at http://geo.intemational.gc.ca/world/site/
includes/print.asp?lang=en&print=l &url=%2Fcan-
am%2Fwashington%2Fambassador%2F010321 -en.asp; North American Aerospace Defense
Command, About Us, available at http://www.norad.mil/aboutus.htm (last visited Mar. 3,
2007). Note that North America is here defined as referring primarily to the U.S. and Canada,
to the exclusion of Mexico.
57. Press Release, White House, U.S.-Canada Smart Border/30 Point Action Plan Up-
date (Dec. 6, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021
206-1.html [hereinafter U.S.-Canada Smart Border Agreement].
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application of biometric-identification technology to cross-border
movement, leading to, as one scholar puts it, "a kind of bureaucratic in-
tegration regarding the flow of people ... that was unthinkable, and
certainly politically untenable, just a few years ago."58
This has been translated in practice to various joint measures to cre-
ate new inspection technologies of people and goods that increasingly
extend beyond the ports-of-entry, just in line with the general trend iden-
tified here of the "shifting" border." The smart-border agreement calls
for developing common standards for biometric information and in-
creased visa-policy coordination. It also permits extensive sharing of
information on high-risk travelers destined to either country using jointly
developed, risk-scoring immigration "lookouts" lists that are managed in
concert on a 24/7 basis through the U.S. National Targeting Center
(NTC) and Canada's National Risk Assessment Centre (NRAC). In addi-
tion, the smart-border agreement laid the foundation for entering into a
"safe-third country" agreement that "allows both countries to manage the
flow of individuals seeking to access their respective asylum systems"
by effectively pushing these claimants back to the first point of entry into
North America.6° This not only creates a buffer zone around each coun-
try, but also shifts the enforcement mechanism towards a new locus for
the exercise of legal authority: the continental perimeter.6 '
58. Greg J. Anderson, North American Economic Integration and the Challenges
Wrought by 9/11, 3 J. HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY MGMT. 3, 9 (2006), available at
http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol3/iss2/2.
59. The erection of smart-borders in an age of potential mega-national security crises is
largely driven by self-interest of sovereign entities, but it requires a greater deal of cooperation
among them in order to be successful. Despite their significance, few of these developments
ever reach the spotlight of popular media, nor are they to be found in the inflated political
rhetoric that often surrounds U.S. immigration law and policy moves in the post 9/11 era.
60. See Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
United States of America for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from
Nationals of Third Countries, U.S.-Can., Dec. 5, 2002, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/
english/policy/safe-third.html [hereinafter Safe Third Country Agreement]. In this way, both
countries manage to uphold their obligation to non-refoulement, while gaining greater strate-
gic depth. For critical commentary, see Audrey Macklin, Disappearing Refugees: Reflections
on the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 365
(2005).
61. This border "shifting" strategy was initially devised in Europe (through the Dublin
Convention) in response to specific geopolitical pressures, allowing the European Union to
push away its refugee-admission border to "gate-keeper" states in order to protect its "core."
But this strategy has since proliferated beyond Europe. A decade later, we find a similar policy
implemented in North America, with the entry into force of the US-Canada Safe Third Coun-
try agreement in 2004. See Safe Third Country Agreement, supra note 60. Such cooperation
enhances, as the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services publicly noted, "the
two nations' ability to manage, in an orderly fashion, asylum claims brought by persons cross-
ing our common border." Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United
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And I have not yet said a word about joint cargo pre-inspections and
pre-screening of goods arriving from overseas, and the setting up of da-
tabases of "trusted" frequent travelers, truck drivers, and shipping
companies that are permitted to use electronic and related identifiers that
facilitate swift crossing at land, sea, and air "ports of entry"-although
the inspection itself often takes place far away from the territorial border.
Indeed, the smart-border agreement explicitly states the goal "develop-
ing approaches to move customs and immigration activities away from
the [actual] border to improve security and relieve congestion where
possible. 62 In pushing the borders of immigration (and customs) regula-
tion outward-as close as possible to the point of origin-the national
territory becomes the last line of defense instead of the main one, as it
was in the past. Collectively, these measures provide strategic depth, al-
lowing the trading partners in NAFTA's heavy-traffic economy to better
regulate their "hemispheric" perimeter-from afar-with the guiding
aim of distinguishing authorized, low-risk, and pre-cleared travelers
from high-risk cross-border movement of "irregular migrants. 63
What is astonishing here is not only that governments are taking
drastic steps to "promote the creation and development of systems that
allow for rapid and reliable identity checks to be carried out"-most
likely by other countries' immigration officials, but also that the degree
of international cooperation among national law-enforcement agencies
that is required in order to make this system of verification realistically
workable.64 This development is perhaps most vividly reflected in the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (also
known as the Border Security Act), in which the United States initially
required the citizens of other countries to present machine-readable
passports with digital photos imprinted in them in order to gain admis-
States and Canada to Implement Safe Third Country Agreement on Asylum (Dec. 29, 2004),
available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressreleaselSafe- I 2-29-94.pdf.
62. U.S.-Canada Smart Border Agreement, supra note 57, at point #15.
63. These trends have only further deepened with the introduction of the Security and
Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), which was jointly announced by the U.S.,
Canada, and Mexico in 2005. The SPP creates a template for regulatory harmonization of the
countries' border management, security, trade, and bioprotection measures. See White House,
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America Security Agenda (Mar. 23, 2005),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/200503233.html. For further
details, see http://www.spp.gov; see also Jason Ackleson & Justin Kastner, The Security and
Prosperity Partnership of North America, 36 AM. REV. CAN. STU. 207 (2006).
64. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2005)7 of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States Concerning Identity and Travel Documents and the
Fight Against Terrorism (Mar. 30, 2005), available at https://coe.int/+/e/legal-affairs/legal-co-
operation/fightagainstterrorism/2.opled-text3/Rec2005.7E.pdf. See Enhanced Border Secu-
rity and Visa entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002).
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sion to the United States as non-immigrant visitors.65 As of 2006, these
travel-document requirements were made even stiffer. To gain visa-free
admission, any new passport issued by an eligible visa-waiver country
must (as DHS recently clarified) be an "e-passport," which includes "an
integrated computer chip capable of storing biographic information from
the date page, as well as other biometric information, such as the re-
quired digital photograph of the holder." 6 In addition to the smart-chip
requirements, DHS is taking steps "to strengthen document integrity by
requiring the visa-wavier countries to commit to several measures con-
cerning lost and stolen passports. 67 The latter include the requirement of
reporting lost and stolen passports to INTERPOL (the world's largest
international police organization, with 186 member countries) and to
DHS' Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit.
The U.S.-led push towards "smartening" borders and tightening go-
vernmental regulation of travel documents is further strengthened by
changes occurring on the other side of the Atlantic, where the European
Union is aggressively building its virtual "external bo ." 68 IUnin i agres vey ilingitsvirua "e e l rders . In 2004,
this policy mandate led to the creation of a European-wide agency for
the "management of operational cooperation at the external borders of
the member states," known as FRONTEX. 69 Working diligently to fulfill
its control and surveillance mandate, FRONTEX has "adopted biomet-
rics as a means to enhance interoperability between states, notably in the
field of identity verification, and the return of illegal migrants"7° This
"interoperability," as the collection, retrieval and sharing of sensitive per-
sonal information encoded in passports and other identity cards is
referred to in the professional jargon of immigration regulators, has further
accelerated with the development-as the 2005 EU Council of Ministers
recommends-of "effective systems of registration of modification [of
65. See Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002).
66. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Visa Waiver Program: Passport Re-
quirements Timeline, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xtrvlsec/programs/content-multi_
image_0021 .shtm#1 (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
67. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, DHS to Require Digital Photos
in Passports for Visa Waiver Travelers (Jun. 16, 2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xnews/releases/pressjrelease_0691 .shtm.
68. See THE WALL AROUND THE WEST: STATE BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION CONTROLS
IN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE (Peter Andreas & Timothy Snyder eds., 2000).
69. The European Council (EC), Council Regulation No. 2007/2004 (Oct. 21, 2004),
available at http://register.consilium.eu.intpdf/en/O4/stlO/stlO827.en.04.pdf. FRONTEX is
assigned with the task of providing "[c]oordination of operational cooperation between Mem-
ber States in the field of management of external borders." See FRONTEX Tasks, available at
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/ofigin-and-tasks/tasks/.
70. Rebekah Thomas, Biometrics, International Migration and Human Rights, 7 EUR.
J. MIGRATION & L. 377, 385 (2005).
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personal information] resulting from events occurring abroad."7' On this
account, domestic law enforcement agencies have to carry out tasks in-
volving the identity documents issued by a government other than their
own. For instance, if a French passport is stolen in the United States, it
will be the responsibility of American law-enforcement agencies to in-
form their French counterparts of this event, as part of the global
identification system, which, according to its advocates, has the potential
to "cut wait times, reduce government fees for travelers, fight illegal
immigration and.., better defend nations from terrorists.
7 2
This big-brother-like approach to regulating cross-border mobility
will only become more pronounced if the next phase of "smart border"
implementation takes place, that stage will see the use of radio frequency
identification (RFID) technology to record the entry and exit of indi-
viduals across national or regional borders simply by reading the
information coded in the smart chip of their biometric travel documents.
A number of U.S. land borders are already testing the RFID technology
as part of a DHS pilot project.73 The United Kingdom is currently im-
plementing its version of the electronic or "virtual border" scheme,
which is designed "to use advance passenger information provided by
airlines, to screen, record and even refuse entry to individuals before they
even leave their country of origin. 74 This would represent the ultimate
merge of policy and technology in shifting the border of immigration
regulation as far away as possible from the territory of the admitting
state.
Add to this the EU-US Agreement on Passenger Name Records of
2004, which was designed to comply with U.S. demands to require air
carriers to transfer to American authorities the passenger-name-records
(PNR) information about those on board U.S.-bound flights for the pur-
pose of assessing the risk of these international travelers before they
reach this country's actual, physical shores. 75 This development is also
important because it represents a casebook example of some of the more
profound and potentially far-reaching implications of the shifting border
71. Council of Europe, supra note 64; see also Thomas, supra note 70.
72. See Jonathan Marino, Head of Visitor Tracking System Wants Global ID System,
GOVEXEC.coM, Apr. 25, 2006, http://www.govexec.com/story-page.cfm?articleid=33925
&dcn=egvet.
73. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Testing of Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) Technology at Land Borders Questions and Answers (Aug. 8, 2005),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press-release_0714.shtm.
74. Thomas, supra note 70, at 379.
75. Agreement on the Processing and Transfer of PNR Data by Air Carriers to the
United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
U.S.-E.C., May 28, 2004, Temp. State Dep't No. 04-107, 2004 WL 1809735.
[Vol. 30:809
Immigration Regulation
of immigration regulation: a system initially designed to detect high-risk
foreigners becomes a pretext for mass surveillance directed at the Amer-
ican people. To wit, it was recently revealed that DHS has used the PNR
data collected through the EU-US agreement not only to regulate the
movement of non-citizens, but also to create a massive "Automated Tar-
geting System" (ATS) that generates a risk assessment score for each
traveler-including millions of U.S. citizens.76
V. REGULATING CITIZENS: "EXTERNAL" CONTROL
MEASURES TURN INWARDS
These new measures significantly re-draw the line of inclusion and
exclusion, blurring once firm distinctions between protected citizens and
less-welcomed aliens.77 Indeed, we increasingly witness how border con-
trol requirements initially designed to apply only to members of other
nations (i.e. those seeking admission into "our gates"), fast travel to chal-
lenge long-accepted norms concerning U.S. citizens as well. The recent
implementation of new U.S. e-passport regulations, which I now turn to
discuss, illustrates this last point. These recent policy changes represent
"the most significant changes in border control in years, as federal offi-
cials try to bring the process of checking identification into the digital
age."78 No less important for the purposes of our discussion, these new
measures are inward looking: affecting not aliens, but Americans.
Beginning in 2007, all U.S. citizens applying for a passport will re-
ceive a document that looks like the traditional type, but in fact includes
an embedded "smart" chip that stores a digital photo of the passport car-
rier and other personal information. The adoption of the American
version of the biometric "e-passport" (previously demanded only of non-
citizens seeking to gain admission into our gates) has followed little if
any public deliberation concerning the various civil liberties and privacy
76. See DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE AUTOMATED
TARGETING SYSTEM (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/
privacy-piacbp-ats.pdf.
77. This "redrawing" of the line of inclusion/exclusion is further complicated by the
creation of "gradations" of the citizenship privileges offered to different members of the polity
itself, as reflected, for example, in the recent court sagas of Hamdi and Padilla. See Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, 541 U.S. 426 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). For commentary,
see Ediberto Romdn, The Citizenship Dialectic, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 557 (2006); Juliet
Stumpt, Citizens of an Enemy Land: Enemy Combatants, Aliens, and the Constitutional Rights
of the Psedo-Citizen, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79 (2004).
78. Roger Yu, Travel to Canada, Mexico is about to Change with New Passport Rules:
"Smart" Chip Added to Increase Security, USA TODAY, Jan. 2, 2007 at 8A.
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concerns that the new passport may cause.' 9 What we do find in spate are
governmental agencies' declarations, confidently proclaiming that the
"new generation of the U.S. passport [which] includes biometric tech-
nology ... will take security and travel facilitation to a new level."8° On
this account, "the introduction of biometric or 'e-passports' will further
enhance global security." This new level of security will be achieved, it
is argued, by the addition of "a small contactless integrated circuit (com-
puter chip) embedded in the [passport's] back cover, . . . enabl[ing]
biometric comparison, through the use of facial recognition technology
at international borders."8' Notice here the subtle bleeding of interna-
tional borders into domestic regulations affecting the situation of
citizens, not aliens. Rolling out this "new generation" of border control
measures is anything but business-as-usual. Instead, it represents a sig-
nificant expansion in the government's powers to engage in massive
collection, storage and retrieval of biometric information, which extends
beyond the standard gaze of regulating noncitizens: namely, policing the
mobility of full members as well. Just a number of years ago these de-
velopments would have seemed more fitting for a science-fiction
novelist's mal-utopia than describing our increasingly regulated every-
day reality. We are thus witnessing here the unfolding of yet another
kind of shifting border: the increased post 9/11 regulation of the non-
citizen has become a precursor for adopting unprecedented immigration
control measures affecting the quintessential member: the American citi-
82
zen.
The Electronic Passport logo (shown below) is the international
symbol for an electronic passport. It signifies that the passport contains
an integrated circuit or chip on which data about the passport and pass-
port bearer is stored. The logo will be displayed at border inspection
79. Although there has been little public debate over these issues, specialized non-
governmental organizations, such as Privacy International, have provided detailed information
concerning the severity of civil liberties and privacy concerns associated with the introduction
of biometric passports. See PRIVACY INT'L, BACKGROUND ON BIOMETRIC PASSPORTS (2004),
http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd%5B347%5D=x-347-61327.
80. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Department of State Begins Issuing Electronic
Passports to the Public (Aug. 14, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2006/70433.htm.
81. U.S. Dep't of State, The U.S. Electronic Passport, http://travel.state.govl
passport/eppt/eppt_2498.html# (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
82. This is a main theme advanced by constitutional and immigration law scholars in
related contexts of blurring the lines between the citizen and non-citizen. See, e.g., T. Alexan-
der Aleinikoff, The ightening Circle of Membership, 22 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 915 (1995);
Linda Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Migrants and the National Imagination,
29 CONN. L. REV. 555 (1996); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002); Leti
Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1575 (2002).
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lanes at all airports and transit ports equipped with special data readers
for Electronic Passports."3
0
VI. INTERDICTING "UNWANTED" MIGRANTS: CANADA'S OVERSEAS
IMMIGRATION OFFICERS AND RELIANCE
ON THIRD-PARTY ACTORS
America's "shifting" border is part of a larger transformation, which
is complemented by the regulatory actions undertaken by other leading
immigrant-receiving countries. Consider Canada, its neighbor to the
North, for example. It is well known that Canada shares a massive land
border with the United States (often referred to as "the world's longest
undefended border"), but is otherwise surrounded by large bodies of wa-
ter and ice. Given its geopolitical location, Canada is reached primarily
by air travel, which lends itself to immigration-regulatory techniques that
rely on overseas interdiction: the act of prohibiting and intercepting un-
authorized migrants from arriving at the border, and stopping them on
their way to the desired destination country. This way, Canada can avoid
triggering the constitutional provisions that were established to apply to
protect the rights of non-citizens landing on Canadian territory.8
As part of a comprehensive study on immigration-triggered deten-
tion and removal, Canada's Senate Standing Committee on Citizenship
and Immigration concluded in 1998 "that the interdiction abroad of peo-
ple who are inadmissible to Canada is the most efficient manner of
reducing the need for costly, lengthy removal processes."8 The following
year, in 1999, Canada began to aggressively implement the technique of
interdiction abroad, effectively relocating its immigration regulation ac-
tivities further away from its "real" physical frontiers. This has been
83. U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Electronic Passport: Frequently Asked Questions, avail-
able at http://travel.state.gov/passport/eppt/eppt_2788.html# (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
84. See Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R 177 (Can.).
85. See SENATE REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND REMOVAL, at recommendation 18 (1998),
available at http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/361/ci i/reports/rpl03 151 3/ciirpOl/
09-rec-e.htm.
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done by stationing Canadian immigration officials in major foreign-
transit hubs located primarily in Europe and Asia, granting them author-
ity to "work with other government departments, international partners,
local immigration and law enforcement agencies and airlines"86 in order
to determine if incoming travelers have the proper documentation for
admission. 7 If they cannot provide such documents (a passport, valid
visa, or an internationally recognized laissez-passes), these would-be
entrants are turned away before they embark on a flight to Canada.
While this may appear like a mere technicality, it is anything but. Being
turned away before reaching Canadian territory is crucially important for
defining the scope of constitutional protections to which these non-
citizens are entitled. For if the very same individuals were to land on
Canadian soil, by virtue of the landmark 1985 Canadian Supreme Court
decision in Singh, they would have been entitled to a full oral hearing to
determine the merits of their claim to stay, even if they were carrying
improper documents. No similar rights apply to them if they are inter-
dicted prior to admission. Here again we see an example of immigration-
enforcement measures that occur outside the national territory in an
attempt to deter, indeed "combat global irregular migration" (as official
government documents put it) by stopping people en route to Canada-
that is, by prohibiting their ability to reach the desired destination in the
first place.89
Canada, as well as the United States, also relies heavily on third-
party actors, in particular airline carriers, as "enforcers" of their respec-
tive immigration regulation and border control provisions. As many
seasoned travelers will know, it is usually airline personnel who take
pains to verify that the required documents and visas are in place prior to
permitting embarkation on international flights. They do so, at least in
part, because their companies face steep financial penalties by the re-
ceiving countries if they bring into their territories improperly
documented persons.90 For instance, Canadian immigration law permits
86. See Canada Border Services Agency, Fact Sheet: Immigration Intelligence-
Irregular Migration, http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/media/facts-faits/030-eng.html.
87. See CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CAN., REVIEW OF THE IMMIGRATION CONTROL
OFFICER NETWORK-FINAL REPORT, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/research/
auditico/01summary-e.html. Formally, the role of these immigration officials is merely advi-
sory, in order to avoid legal challenges by those denied entry. See Brouwer and Kumin,
Interception and Asylum, supra note 50, at 10.
88. Singh, I S.C.R 177.
89. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE REPORT
OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION, at recommendation 21
(2002), available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/competing.html.
90. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), S.C. 2001, ch. 27 (Can.).
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the federal government to seek reimbursement from airline carriers for
"costs of detention, return, and, in some cases, medical care" associated
with irregular migrants that came aboard their flights. 9' The Canadian
policy of overseas interdiction has focused on expanding the reach of the
shifting border far beyond its territory. The results of erecting these le-
gal-walls abroad have been dramatic: the government recently reported
that the work of these officers resulted in an interdiction rate of 72% in
2003. This means that of all attempted unauthorized entries by air, the
vast majority were stopped before they reached Canada.92 Following
Canada's lead, the United States introduced a similar program, called the
Immigration Security Initiative (ISI), which places ISI officers overseas
in order to decrease the number of people arriving in the United States
with improper or false travel documents. The United Kingdom and Aus-
tralia have also developed comparable mechanisms of immigration
regulation and control abroad, which work in close cooperation with the
American and Canadian overseas immigration officers, creating a col-
laborative "network" to interdict improperly documented travelers before
those travelers reach their respective territorial boundaries.93 No less sig-
nificant for our discussion, these overseas immigration officers operate
under the recommended guidelines developed by the International Air
Transport Association (IATA), which is a non-state organization
that represents the global airline industry. The role of organizations like
IATA reveal not only the shifting location of the border but also the in-
creased collaboration among private and public actors in regulating the
91. See Brouwer, supra note 50, at 10. In the same vein, the 1990 Schengen Implemen-
tation Agreement obliges all members of the European Union to implement carrier sanctions.
This mandate was further enhanced in 2001, by a European Council Directive that aims to
harmonize these financial sanctions as a powerful regulatory tool, used here by member-states
in concert, to diminish the prospects of arrival to their shores of unauthorized migrants. See
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Govern-
ments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the
French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders. See Text of the
1990 Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement, 30 Int'l Material 84 (1991). See also
Guiraudon and Lahav, A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate, supra note 10.
92. The problem with this data is that no one knows for certain how many people have
actually entered Canada without permission or authorization. See STATUS OF WOMEN CAN.,
GENDERING CANADA'S IMMIGRATION LAWS, available at http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/
pubspr/0662435621/200607_0662435621_13 e.html. In 2002, Citizenship and Immigration
Canada (CIC) reported that more than 40,000 people attempting to travel to Canada without
proper documentation were interdicted abroad. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Fact
Sheet: September 11, 2001: A Year Later, available at http://circ.jmellon.com/docs/htmI
fact sheet_septemberj 112001_a-yearlater.html.
93. See CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CAN., COMPARABLE ICO NETWORK MODELS,
REVIEW OF THE IMMIGRATION CONTROL OFFICE NETWORK-FINAL REPORT app. A, available
at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/research/audit/ico/500appendix-e.html.
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malleable, de-territorialized "edges" of well-off polities seeking to pre-
vent admission of persons they deem unwanted.94
VII. ERASING TERRITORY: AUSTRALIA'S EXCISION POLICY
But perhaps no country has taken the idea of the "shifting borders of
immigration controls" as far as Australia has with its self-imposed "exci-
sion" policy. This policy, created through the Migration Amendment
(Excision from Migration Zone) Act of 2001, and expanded in 2005,
involves the legal removal of the applicability of Australia's standard
immigration and asylum laws from certain parts of its territory that are
more vulnerable to unauthorized access from the surrounding seas. This
federal legislation, explained Australia's Immigration Minister, "will
excise certain Australian territories ... for purposes related to unauthor-
ized arrivals." 95 Such formal "contraction" of certain parts of a country's
own territory for immigration regulation purposes is unprecedented. Yet
the logic behind it should sound familiar by now: this shifting-border
policy was designed specifically to "[allow] for the detention and re-
moval of unauthorized arrivals in the excision zone. 96 This logic is
reminiscent of the inward "bleeding" of the U.S. border into the interior
(the 100-mile in-land zone) in order to conduct expedited removal pro-
ceedings as if they were carried out at the actual frontiers of the United
States.
Australia, even more explicitly than the United States, has, through
the words of law, relocated the border, creating-as the government rea-
dily admits-a distinction between the country's "migration zone" and
"Australia" as we know it on the map.97 This legal maneuver has author-
ized Australia's immigration officials to remove asylum seekers that
have reached the country's "excised" territories, as if they never reached
94. See U.N High Comm'r for Refugees [UNHCR], Standing Committee, Interception
of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: The International Framework and Recommendations for a
Comprehensive Approach, 10, U.N. Doc. EC/50/SC/CPR. 17 (June 9, 2000).
95. See Press Release, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Joint State-
ment with Minister for Justice and Customs: Government Strengthens Border Integrity, MPS
161/2001 (Sept. 17, 2001), http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media-release/ruddockmedia
01/rOl 161.htm.
96. See AUSTRALIAN Gov'T, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL
AFFAIRS, FACT SHEET 71: BORDER MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN BORDER CONTROL: MIGRA-
TION AMENDMENT (2001) [hereinafter Fact Sheet 71] (Excision from Migration Zone)
(Consequential Provisions Act).
97. See AUSTRALIAN Gov'T, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL
AFFAIRS, FACT SHEET 81: AUSTRALIA'S EXCISED OFFSHORE PLACES (Jan. 30, 2007), http://
www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/81excised.htm.
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Australia, although they physically landed on its shores.98 It further
eliminates the possibility of judicial review "in relation to the entry,
status, detention and transfer of a person arriving unlawfully," much like
the post-1996 legislative changes in the United States. 99
The Australian example of excision, where a country effectively
erases certain parts of its territorial space, as it were perforating itself
geographically, may appear to undermine "the very elements of national
sovereignty that immigration controls seek to bulwark."' ° But in practice
excision represents the ultimate attempt to regain control over cross-border
movement in the age of globalization, by exercising, wherever the
regulatory state's immigration officials see fit, its authority to determine
whom to include and whom to exclude-by redefining and shifting the
very spatial reach of a nation's territorial and jurisdictional boundaries:
moving the border of immigration regulation in response to perceived
threats by unauthorized migrants and high-risk travelers.
More limited versions of "excision" are also found in several
high-traffic airports located in European capitals, which have declared
certain parts of these airports, physically located in their national
territories, as "transit zones" where the standard protections of domestic
and international law do not apply. This means that if a person is caught
after disembarking a flight but before reaching the first official EU
border control checkpoint, that person has not "landed" for immigration
regulation purposes. These transit zones are treated as legal black holes,
98. Such asylum seekers are removed to neighboring third-countries, such as Nauru and
Papua New Guinea, with which Australia has entered into contract for the reception of
unauthorized arrivals who have reached its "excised" places, claiming refugee status. See U.S.
COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, COUNTRY REPORT AUSTRALIA,(2002), avail-
able at http://refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?-VIEWSTATE=dDwxMTA 1OTA4MTYwOz
tsPENvdW50cniERDpHbOJ I dHRvbjs%2BPrImhOOqDI29eBMz8bO4PTi8xjW2&cid=313&s
ubm= I 9&ssm=29&map=&_ctlO%3ASearchlnput=+KEYWORD+SEARCH&CountryDD%3
ALocationList=. This practice of "transfer of responsibilities" is permissible under the 1951
Refugee Convention, though it is normally "envisaged as between [s]tates with comparable
protection systems." See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Submission to the Senate Legal and
Constitutional Legislation Committee Inquiry into the Provisions of the Migration Amendment
(Designated Unauthorized Arrivals) Bill 4 (May 2006), available at http://www.
unhcr.org.au/pdfs/designatedunauthorisedarrivalsbill.pdf.
99. See Fact Sheet 7 1, supra note 96. In the United States, the Supreme Court permitted
limited review of post-removal detention (in Zadvydas) and habeas corpus petitions (in St.
Cyr). See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). For
commentary on the significance of these cases, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining
Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 365
(2002); Nancy Morawetz, INS v. St. Cyr: The Campaign to Preserve Court Review and Stop
Retroactive Application of Deportation Laws, in IMMIGRATION STORIEs 280 (David A. Martin
& Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
100. See Robert A. Davidson, Spaces of Immigration "Prevention ": Interdiction and the
Nonplace, 33 DIACRITICs 3, 6 (2003).
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operating in a limbo space, "in which officials 'are not obliged to
provide asylum seekers or foreign individuals with some or all of the
protections available to those officially on state territory."""' The creation
of these legal "grey zones" is not entirely new; the U.S. navy base in
Guantanamo Bay, before it became (in)famous for serving as the
detention place for hundreds of foreign nationals suspected of terrorism
links, has been used as a repository for asylum seekers (particularly from
Haiti) whose shattered boats were intercepted before they reached the
U.S. territorial waters to prevent those onboard from claiming refuge at
"our gates."'' 2 Again, we witness the craftsmanship of flexing the
muscles of legal definitions and categories to interdict unwanted
immigrants before they arrive at the border; this undermines their legal
standing, removing a range of procedural protections otherwise due to
them in admission and removal proceedings in Australia, Canada, or
European countries, in a manner similar to that of the United States.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
While different polities are likely to continue to experiment with dif-
ferent legal techniques that best suit their particular needs, the large-
scale trajectory remains crystal clear: immigration-regulatory agencies
are breaking new ground in their attempt to regain control over the
cross-border movement of people in an age of increased economic inter-
dependence and growing concerns about national security and terrorism.
They do so through policy initiatives that stretch the boundaries of "the
border," turning it into a flexible, malleable legal construct often re-
101. Id. at 9 (citing Francis Kpatinde, Welcome to Limbo, REFUGEES MAGAZINE iSS. 100
(1995), available at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3b54400b4.html) Similar concerns
arise in the context of the practice of "extraordinary renditions," whereby, according to recent
reports, aircrafts operated by the CIA flew through and stopped over in Europe, carrying sus-
pected terrorists and other detainees. These terrorist suspects where then "rendered" for
interrogation to countries that were cited by the U.S. State Department for human-rights viola-
tions, including torture. The extrajudicial nature of rendition has been severely criticized by
human rights activists, European governments, and the European Parliament. See MARY
CRANE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. TREATMENT OF TERROR SUSPECTS AND
U.S.-E.U. RELATIONS (2005), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9350/; see also
EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, REPORT ON
THE ALLEGED USE OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BY THE CIA FOR TRANSPORT AND ILLEGAL
DETENTION OF PRISONERS (2006).
102. For a brief exposition of the governmental practice of detention without trial of
Haitian refugees at Guantanamo in the 1990s, and the legal challenges that followed, see Har-
old Hongju Koh, Captured by Guantanamo, OPEN DEMOCRACY, Sept. 26, 2005, available at
http://www.opendemocracy.net. On today's use of Guantanamo Bay, see Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004); Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 949 (2006).
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moved from the traditionally fixed, static location of cartographically
marked and internationally recognized borderlines. These developments,
which de-couple authority from territory and rights from aliens, allow
the apparatus of the state to extend its influence and regulatory mandate,
marking an interesting contrast to earlier predictions about the "demise"
of the nation-state and the breakdown of borders.
The basic function of immigration regulation may not have changed
drastically (it still involves control over admission into a bounded mem-
bership community) but what has changed dramatically in today's world
is where, and how, enforcement takes place, departing radically from the
territorial-centered conception of the static border, carved under the
Westphalian image. And not only is the location of the border shifting:
another major transition on the ground is the creation of high-tech barri-
ers and pre-clearance screening processes, which require increased
bilateral and multilateral cooperation among countries in their joint ef-
fort to restrict access to those arriving from unstable and poorer
polities.' °3 As scores of recent domestic and international reports indi-
cate, the latter are undertaking ever-more desperate and dangerous routes
in their attempt to pass through "our gates," seeking the relative security
and prosperity taken for granted by those already safely within them. °0 It
is primarily in response to these inflows of unlawful entrants that the
U.S. is now embarking on an apparently contradictory trend to the "shift-
ing" border: namely, re-asserting the physical dimension of the static,
territorial border through a proposed "reinforced fence" to be erected
along a 700-mile stretch across the U.S.-Mexico divide line. If we were to
isolate this development, we might (too swiftly) conclude that America
103. For instance, the United States and Canada share information on intelligence and
specific data concerning individuals seeking visa admission at their respective diplomatic and
consular posts overseas. Both countries now screen passengers at check-in points at overseas
airports to provide recommendations to airline carriers on whether to permit boarding to North
American destinations for potentially high-risk travelers. The border here is not only de-
territorialized, but also gradually extended to a hemispheric perimeter, making baby-steps
towards a semi-coordinated immigration and customs regime that is implemented far-away the
United States and Canada's actual territorial borderlines. And we have not yet said a word
about joint cargo pre-inspection and pre-screening of goods arriving from overseas, pushing
the border of immigration and customs regulation "outward," as close as possible to the car-
go's point of origin, gaining strategic depth in the process. The erection of these "smart
borders" in age of mega-national security alerts is driven by each country's self-interest but
requires a great deal of cooperation between them in order to be successful. Despite their
significance in "shifting" the locus of immigration and custom regulation, few of these devel-
opments reach the popular media spotlight nor the often-inflated political rhetoric surrounding
U.S. immigration law and policy reform. See infra, Part IV.
104. GLOBAL COMM'N ON INT'L MIGRATION, MIGRATION IN AN INTERCONNECTED
WORLD: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ACTION (2005), available at www.gcim.org/en/
finalreport.html.
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has decided to harden its borders, unilaterally creating a "fortress Amer-
ica."' 5 Perhaps no other legislative development better highlights this
aspect of U.S. immigration regulation policy than the recently enacted
Secure Fence Act of 2006, which authorizes the Secretary of Homeland
Security to "take all actions... necessary and appropriate to achieve and
maintain operational control over the entire international land and mari-
time borders of the United States."' 6 These actions include, as the Secure
Fence Act clarifies, the systemic surveillance of the border through and
the erection of "physical infrastructure enhancements to prevent unlaw-
ful entry by aliens into the United States."' 0' The very prospect of
building a "reinforced fenc[e]" on the site of the U.S international border
with Mexico, with little or no consultation with its officials, has gener-
ated waves of anxiety, not to mention criticism from America's NAFTA
trading partners.' 8
While representing a "strong" stance against unlawful admission,
here translated into the promise of regaining physical control over the
actual border, any closure imposed by the United States is, as one
scholar aptly observes, "the equivalent of the world's most powerful
country imposing a trade embargo on itself."' The U.S. border is not
merely a site where people cross, most of them entering through recog-
nized ports of entry with Canada and Mexico."0 It is also one of the main
international hubs of economic activity, which facilitates, as a top U.S.
government official recently estimated, "[n]early $2.2 billion in trade
flows among our three countries on a daily basis.""' Much of this mas-
105. See Peter Andreas, A Tale of Two Borders: The U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico Lines
after 9-11, in THE REBORDERING OF NORTH AMERICA 14-15 (Peter Andreas & Thomas J.
Birsteker eds., 2003).
106. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, § 2(a), 120 Stat. 2638 (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)).
107. Secure Fence Act § 2(a)(2).
108. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, § 3(2)(a), 120 Stat. 2638 (codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2006)). Mexico sent the U.S. a diplomatic note officially expressing its
criticism of the plan to erect a fence at the border, calling it an "offence." See Associated
Press, Mexico Angered by Lack of Immigration Reform, Decision to Increase Security at Bor-
der, INT. HERALD TRIB., Oct. 5, 2006.
109. See Stephen B. Flynn, The False Conundrum: Continental Integration Versus Ho-
melandSecuriy, in THE REBORDERING OF NORTH AMERICA 110-127, supra note 105.
110. For detailed analysis of 1-94 non-immigrant admission in 2005, see DHS, 2005
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 63-88 (2005). On admission from Canada and Mex-
ico, see JEANNE BATALOVA, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, SPOTLIGHT ON TEMPORARY
ADMISSIONS OF NONIMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES (2006), available at http://
www.migrationinformation.orgUSFocus/display.cfm?ID=418.
Ill. See Mary Peters, Secretary of Transportation, Remarks for the Border Trade Alli-
ance (March I, 2007) (emphasis added), available at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/
peters030107.htm.
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sive trade flow relies on trucks hauling cargo across the U.S.-Canada and
U.S.-Mexico land borders. The erection of fenced barriers, coupled with
more intensive inspections at the border (rather than high-tech pre-
inspections at the point of origin, which are already used extensively to
screen travelers and cargo shipments entering the U.S.), may have a
chilling effect on such exchanges, squeezing the already overburdened
"cross-border transportation arteries that provides [NAFTA's] life-
blood."" 2
This has not been lost on American policymakers. Vouching to get
tough on illegal immigration by erecting a physical refortification at the
traditional location of the border, the United States walls itself off from
unauthorized intruders-reasserting in the process the most ancient
symbol of state power: the physical presence of an almost impenetrable
border. At the same time, as we have seen above, America's immigration
regulators and enforcers have embarked on a more toilsome (although
less visible) process of "redrawing the line" of immigration regulation,
allowing the DHS to create a "portable" enforcement regime that can be
retreated inside, stretched outside, or simply relocated back to the tradi-
tional borderline, as in the case of the "reinforced fence."
It is ironic that the U.S. immigration talk is so heavily focused on
erecting the fence as a symbol of regained sovereignty, while its immi-
gration regulation and enforcement actions are in fact far more
multifaceted and nuanced."3 We find a similar discrepancy, though in the
opposite direction, between the EU celebration of its "borderless" vision,
and its restless erection of a state-of-the-art technological and regulatory
border around its free-movement area. ' 4 As noted above, the EU has re-
cently become a major leader in pushing towards the adoption of a
"global ID management system" to allow its member-states to better
protect themselves against undesirable irregular entrants while facilitat-
ing rapid and reliable identification of international travelers deemed
trusted and welcomed."5 This conflation of massive identity- and bio-
metric-information collection, extensive collaboration among developed
countries' immigration officials and law-enforcement agencies (often
stationed on each others' territories), and a more flexible notion of the
112. See Andreas, supra note 105.
113. See the concrete examples discussed above, supra Parts H-IV.
114. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE, IDENTITY AND TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AND THE
FIGHT AGAINST TERROR, RECOMMENDATION REc(2005)7 ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF
MINISTER OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ON MARCH 2005 AND EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
(2005). The European Union is bent on setting up a European Corps of Border Guards, in
addition to extending the Schengen agreement to its accession members.
115. See Marino, supra note 20.
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location of the border of immigration regulation, appears to be the wave
of our brave new "de-territorialized" future. It is not a utopian vision of
free movement for all, but rather a darker and more stratified-let alone
tightly controlled-world of cross-border mobility. In this new world,
the "static" territorial border is merely one component among many;
increasingly, virtual legal barricades are also erected at a distance in or-
der to protect and shield the national territory from "intruders." In the
process this permits the state to avoid the responsibilities and obligations
that at one time applied to "unwanted" entrants at the moment of passing
through "our gates". Given these revamped immigration control measures,
we can safely conclude that borders are by no means "disappearing,"
though they are clearly changing. The evidence presented here shows that
national and regional regulators and law-enforcement agencies have in-
deed "re-invented" and reinvigorated the moving walls of border control,
fueling them with 21st-century security zeal and advanced technology to
pursue the task.
If we were to return to the contrasting images of the border pre-
sented in the literature on citizenship and immigration, namely, the static
versus the disappearing border, what would the recent legal develop-
ments recounted here tell us about the role of the regulatory state in an
era of economic globalization and heightened national security alert?
The conventional wisdom is that increased global interdependence, re-
gional trade agreements, and the proliferation of international travel and
commerce significantly erodes the ability of nations to exercise control
over their borders. As I have shown here, despite-or perhaps because
of-these rapid globalization challenges and increased national security
concerns, regulatory states have "struck back," re-claiming their immi-
gration regulation power and authority.
In today's reality, we find reinvented and reinvigorated borders, ra-
ther than disappearing or increasingly meaningless ones; this state of
affairs contrasts sharply with the decreased regulatory-control predic-
tions of many proponents of a world where territory is "unbundled" from
its tie with national institutions and interests." 6 The legal developments
discussed here include separating physical entry from lawful admission;
expedited removal procedures; collecting biometric information at ports-
of-entry outside the destination country; entry into "smart-border"
agreements that create semi-hemispheric regulation of the border; grow-
ing reliance on pre-inspection and interdiction techniques; or excision of
116. The term "unbundled" is drawn from an influential article by John Gerard Ruggie,
Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT'L
ORG. 139 (1993).
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certain parts of a country's territory to better manage its immigration
regulation regime. All these developments powerfully indicate that
developed countries have hardly given up on their authority to restrict
access. While persisting in their exercise of sovereign authority to de-
termine whom to admit and whom to remove, well-off countries have at
the same time dramatically "retooled" the legal techniques and redefined
the spaces in which they deter irregular migration and curb high-risk
admission.
Unlike the vision of post-nationalists and globalists who see patterns
of border-blurring as manifestation of the declining importance of
national regulation of immigration, I have shown here that such
"de-territorialization" of the border can be explained equally well as rep-
resenting the re-capture by state agencies of their core mandate to permit
access to "desirable" entrants (business visitors, skilled migrants, and so
on) while ever more tightly restricting admission from others (interdicted
travelers, unauthorized migrants, and high-risk security threats, to name
a few "unwanted" categories). " ' This more nuanced picture permits us to
see a complex, multilayered, and ever-transforming border, one that is
drawn and redrawn, through the words of law and acts of regulatory
agencies, to better caliber the admitting state's exclusion lines in re-
sponse to new global challenges. This shifting border, unlike the
refortified physical barrier, is not fixed in time and place. Instead, it re-
lies on law's admission gates, rather than a specific frontier location,
allowing greater flexibility for immigration officials to tailor new strate-
gies (often taken in concert with their counterparts in other countries) to
regain control in today's dangerous world.
We thus find a reality in which border control agencies have ex-
tended their reach-both physically and jurisdictionally-far beyond the
national territory, with no sign of retreat in sight. The collateral conse-
quence has been the delimitation of legal protections once granted to
unauthorized migrants. The entrenched distinctions that have long
guided American immigration law, such as that highlighted in Zadvydas
between "an alien who has effected an entry into the United States" and
"one who has never entered," rest uneasily on increasingly shifting
sands.
117. I discuss these selective immigration regimes at length in Ayelet Shachar, The Race
for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes, 81 NYU L. REv.
149 (2006).
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